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BAD FAITH FEE-SHIFTING IN FEDERAL
COURTS: WHAT CONDUCT QUALIFIES?
JACOB SINGER†
INTRODUCTION
Under the so-called “American rule” of attorney fees, each
party pays its own attorney fees, regardless of the outcome of the
proceeding.1 Federal courts, however, have always recognized
numerous exceptions to the American rule, one of which is the
“bad faith exception.”2 The exception allows courts to order feeshifting despite the American rule. Specifically, when one of the
parties to the action has acted in extreme bad faith, it must pay
its opponent’s attorney fees.3 The exception promotes justice by
making the prevailing party whole.4 Additionally, the exception
enhances judicial efficiency by minimizing the number of
frivolous claims on the courts’ dockets.5
†
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1
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4
(1973); Peter N. Cubita et al., Note, Awards of Attorney’s Fees in the Federal Courts,
56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 278–79 (1982). The American rule contrasts with the socalled “English rule,” which allows for attorney fees, which allows the prevailing
party—subject to a few exceptions—to recover reasonable attorney fees from the
losing party. See Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney’s Fees and the Federal Bad Faith
Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320 (1977). Although the substance of the rule was
announced in the eighteenth century, the rule’s name was not coined until the
beginning of the twentieth century. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10–11, 27–
28 (1984).
2
For a complete list of the exceptions to the American rule, see infra note 18.
3
The bad faith exception is typically applied in this manner, but the Supreme
Court has allowed for the possibility that a prevailing party that acts in bad faith
can be responsible for its opponent’s fees. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 53.
4
See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719
(1967); see also infra note 29.
5
See, e.g., Crum & Forster Ins. Co. v. Goodmark Indus., Inc., No. 05-CV-3633,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2008). This argument relies
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Consider the following: A business owner intentionally
started a fire—his fourth in twelve years—in his warehouse that
was insured by an insurance company. After the fire destroyed
his warehouse, the business owner filed an insurance claim.
Among other papers, he submitted a signed statement asserting
that his actions or negligence did not cause the fire. When an
insurance adjuster arrived at the warehouse to assess the
damage, the owner bribed the adjuster to overvalue the loss. The
insurance company paid out nearly $1 million on the fraudulent
claim.
In a criminal action, a federal court convicted the owner of
thirty counts relating to the series of fires he had started at his
warehouse. The insurance company—realizing that its payout to
the owner was based on fraud—demanded restitution from the
owner. The owner refused, and the insurance company filed a
claim to recoup its payment. The court awarded the insurance
company nearly $2 million on summary judgment for the return
of the actual payout, prejudgment and post-judgment interest,
and costs. In an effort to mitigate its litigation costs, the
insurance company moved to request its attorney fees from the
owner, arguing that the owner’s extreme bad faith actions
necessitated the litigation. This scenario played out in Crum &
Forester Insurance Co., where the insurance company sued for
restitution after discovering the fraud. The fraud became
apparent after the owner was convicted in federal court.6
This scenario raised some important questions: Can justice
be served in such a situation absent fee-shifting? Would feeshifting deter this wrongful conduct, thereby promoting a more
constructive form of dispute resolution and a more manageable
court docket?
This Note explores how the federal circuits interpret the bad
faith exception differently and recommends that the exception
must apply to both prelitigation and litigation conduct to serve
the policies of the American rule and the bad faith exception.

on both parties acting with common sense and not continuing an action when it is
clearly unwarranted. The argument, however, discounts the inexplicable reality that
losing parties act with intentional bad faith, both before and during a litigation
proceeding. See id.
6
This situation is substantially similar to the facts of Crum & Forster Insurance
Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at *2–5, *7–10.
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Part I sets out the history underpinning the American rule. Part
II sets forth the rule’s bad faith exception and the policies
underlying the exception. It then distinguishes the common-law
bad faith exception from Rule 11 fee-shifting. Part III introduces
three Supreme Court cases that have established the parameters
of the bad faith exception. It then examines the varying ways in
which the circuit courts have applied these cases and limited the
bad faith exception to conduct occurring during certain time
periods. Part IV examines the reasons the courts have given for
limiting the exception and refutes them. It considers what the
exception’s parameters should be based on the policies behind the
American rule and its bad faith exception. Finally, Part V
proposes applying the bad faith exception to bad faith conduct
both before and during litigation and discusses the ramifications
of such a proposal.
I.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RULE

Originally, the United States followed the English rule with
respect to fee-shifting, which required the losing party to pay the
prevailing party’s attorney fees. This rule had roots stretching as
far back as Roman law.”7 The English rule, however, never took
root in American courts; in 1796, the Supreme Court rejected the
English approach and created the American rule, which requires
each party to pay its own attorney fees.8 The Court opined that
the “general practice of the United States [was] in opposition to”
the English rule.9 Moreover, the Court noted that “even if [the
American rule is] not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to
the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute.”10
The Supreme Court has articulated two general public
policies underlying the adoption of the American rule. First,

7

Buffy D. Lord, Dispute Resolution on the High Seas: Aspects of Maritime
Arbitration, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 71, 86 n.109 (2002) (“The tradition of awarding
attorney’s fees and costs can be traced to Roman law in which the losing party was
required to pay the prevailing party’s costs.”).
8
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796).
9
Id.
10
Id. The Supreme Court “has adhered to [the American rule] up to modern
times. It has become a hard and fast rule of law and is as entrenched as any in the
American judicial system.” Chipser, supra note 1.
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parties should not be punished for merely bringing a suit.11
Second, “litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable
attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial
administration.”12
In the late nineteenth century, after courts refused to make
a common law exception to the American rule,13 hosts of federal
and state statutes attempted to remedy the rule’s harshness by
allowing fee-shifting in limited circumstances. Many courts,
however, found these fee-shifting statutes unconstitutional.14
These courts and other proponents of the American rule argued
that forcing a losing party to pay its opponent’s attorney fees is “a
form of penalty and that a litigant should not be penalized for
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.”15 The burgeoning
anti-American rule movement, however, advocated that “under
[the American rule,] the successful party is never fully
compensated because such party must pay [its] counsel fees
which may be as much or more than the total recovery in the
suit.”16 The American rule needed to be modified to “mak[e]
plaintiffs whole,” thereby ensuring justice in the court system.17
Hence, the bad faith exception to the American rule was born.
II. THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION
A.

Generally

The bad faith exception18 “awards attorney fees against
parties who litigate in bad faith, for the obvious purpose of
11

See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967).
12
Id.
13
See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at
26 (recognizing that courts did not make such an exception until the twentieth
century).
14
See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 26. Courts regarded fee-shifting as something
of a confiscatory act and avoided it unless the legislature unequivocally required it.
See id. at 25. Some courts, therefore, allowed fee-shifting statutes only when the
defendant had committed an illegal act. See id.
15
Chipser, supra note 1, at 321.
16
Id.
17
SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 549 (1992);
Chipser, supra note 1, at 321–22; see sources cited infra note 29.
18
“There are six general categories of exceptions to the ‘American rule:’
(1) Contracts; (2) Bad Faith; (3) Common Fund; (4) Substantial Benefit;
(5) Contempt; and (6) Fee-shifting statutes.” David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-
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deterring illegitimate behavior in the courtroom, and sometimes
outside of it.”19 A bad faith attorney fee award “can be imposed
only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice.”20
The Supreme Court in Hall v. Cole21 adopted the bad faith
exception and explained that “the underlying rationale of ‘fee
shifting’ is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in
triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of ‘bad
faith’ on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.”22 Moreover, the
Court considered fee-shifting necessary to uphold the honor of
the federal courts. “[T]ampering with the administration of
justice . . . is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect
and safeguard the public . . . .”23 While American courts have
generally adopted the bad faith exception, they have done so
uneasily.24 Similarly, although courts and legislatures have
carved out various exceptions to the American rule, they have
shown no desire to dispose of the rule altogether.25
The policies supporting the American rule do not apply to a
party that acts with extreme bad faith. The Supreme Court has
articulated the policies underlying the American rule:
(1) encouraging parties to “vindicate their rights”26 and
(2) relieving the judiciary from dedicating resources to determine
“what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees.”27 These policies do
Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule”
and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 585 (2005). Of the six, the
bad faith exception is the most ambiguous. Id. at 586 & n.28. “In the absence of one
of these equitable exceptions, however, the rule has been consistently followed for
almost 200 years.” Summit Valley Indus. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
456 U.S. 717, 721 (1982) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421
U.S. 240, 249–50 (1975)).
19
Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 29.
20
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979) (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52
(1979) (denying punitive damages); Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air
Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing a policy of denying punitive
damages as its rationale for denying the prevailing party its attorney fees).
21
412 U.S. 1 (1973).
22
Id. at 5.
23
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944),
overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976).
24
Even today it exists only in the federal system and in some states, mostly by
statute. See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 29.
25
See id.
26
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
27
Id.
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not apply to a bad faith party, which, by definition, is not merely
vindicating its rights.28 Moreover, important public policies
argue in favor of a bad faith exception. Such policies involve
“punishment of the losing party, indemnification of the prevailing
party, and . . . deterrence of frivolous and bad faith litigation.”29
These policies apply to a bad faith party whose actions
necessarily requires deterrence and deserve punishment. Bad
faith parties, therefore, deserve to be punished by paying their
opponent’s attorney fees.
B.

Rule 11 Is Not Enough

The bad faith exception to the American rule does not
supersede Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure30
(“Rule 11”) because the bad faith exception’s reach is broader
than Rule 11.31 Under Rule 11, by presenting a pleading to the
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is
at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing
included the fees of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the time, expense, and
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes
reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial
administration.
Id. (citations omitted).
28
For an explanation of why the judicial administration policy—or even the
deterrence policy—does not apply to a bad faith party, see infra Part IV.B. Notably,
the primary policy supporting the American rule is the need to encourage parties to
vindicate their rights. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718.
29
Lord, supra note 7, at 86; see HALPERN ET AL., supra note 17 (finding that the
rationale for awarding attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs is to “deter[ ]
infringement, encourag[e] colorable claims, and mak[e] plaintiffs whole”); John
Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial
Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (1999); K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright
Infringement and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of
the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 205 (1999);
Cubita et al., supra note 1, at 282 n.16.
30
A discussion of Rule 11’s applicability is necessary because when there is badfaith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under
the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent
power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statue nor the Rules
are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power—that is, the bad
faith exception. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991).
31
Conversely, Rule 11 is broader than the bad faith exception as it can force the
“outright dismissal” of the suit and other sanctions, while the bad faith exception’s
only sanction is attorney fees—but that is beyond the scope of this Note. Chambers,
501 U.S. at 45; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). A Rule 11 sanction is limited to what
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court, an attorney represents—amongst other things—that the
litigation “is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation.”32 Should a party bring litigation for an
“improper purpose,”33 Rule 11 gives courts the authority to
impose sanctions on that party. “[S]anction[s] may include
nonmonetary directives[,] an order to pay a penalty into court[,]
or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence,
an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the
reasonable attorney’s fees . . . directly resulting from the
violation.”34
Rule 11 is narrower than the bad faith exception in two
important ways. First, the Rule’s sanction power does not have
jurisdiction over acts that degrade the judicial system, such as
attempts to “deprive [a] [c]ourt of jurisdiction by acts of fraud”
that are “performed outside the confines of [the] court.”35 Second,
Rule 11 only applies to the presentation of “pleading[s], written
motion[s], or other paper[s]” to the court.36 The bad faith
exception, on the other hand, “reach[es] more litigation abuses”37
and applies to all conduct during litigation and perhaps even
conduct that precedes the litigation.38 Therefore, the bad faith

suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
33
Id.
34
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (emphasis added).
35
NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 (W.D. La. 1989),
aff’d, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, sub nom., Chambers, 501 U.S. 32.
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 97 (3d
Cir. 2008) (holding that the purpose of this Rule 11 requirement is to “streamline
litigation”). There is a third distinction. Courts may order Rule 11 sanctions sua
sponte. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3) (“On the Court’s Initiative. On its own, the court may
order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically
described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).”). On the other hand, courts
cannot order common law bad faith fee-shifting absent a motion by one of the
parties. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49–50. This distinction, however, is not germane
to a discussion of the bad faith exception’s timeline. Moreover, whether fee-shifting
can be ordered by the court sua sponte is usually irrelevant because parties are, if
anything, overeager to request fee-shifting.
37
Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d 344, 352 (8th Cir. 2003).
38
This Note analyzes what timeline is subject to the bad faith exception. See
infra Part III.
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exception acts as a catch-all for bad faith conduct that is not
subject to Rule 11.39
C.

Bad Faith Timeline

Although federal courts universally accept the existence of
the bad faith exception, no such consensus exists regarding what
constitutes the requisite bad faith conduct necessary to trigger
the exception.40 There are three distinct time periods in which
bad faith can occur and possibly warrant the bad faith
exception.41 Bad faith conduct can occur during the litigation,
when a party obstinately refuses to recognize his opponent’s clear
legal right, or during the conduct that is the basis of the cause of
action.42 All federal courts agree that bad faith conduct during
the litigation itself warrants the bad faith exception.43 Litigation
bad faith conduct includes frivolous motions, noncompliance with
court orders, an unreasonable refusal to investigate claims or
take part in mediation,44 and any other conduct intended to
harass a party to the litigation.45 Conversely, courts are divided

39

See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43.
In other words, there is no consensus regarding which conduct is subject to
the bad faith exception and its fee-shifting penalty.
41
Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1230
(6th Cir. 1984). This is subject to the individual court’s interpretation of the bad
faith exception’s timeline.
42
Id.
43
Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 622 F. Supp. 232, 238 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (“It
appears universally accepted that bad faith in the conduct of the litigation itself may
warrant imposition of fees, as may the bad faith maintenance of a meritless claim or
defense.” (emphasis added)); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Pub. Co., 240
F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 41 F. App’x 507 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“[B]ad faith in the conduct of the litigation is a valid ground for an award of
[attorney] fees.”); Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1230 (“Although the bad faith exception is
firmly established in Supreme Court precedent, its limits are not precisely
defined.”).
44
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (assessing attorney fees for not complying with a
court order); Peoples Mortgage Corp. v. Kan. Bankers Sur. Co., 62 F. App’x 232, 239
(10th Cir. 2003) (finding attorney fees against a party who did not investigate the
claim and refused mediation); Interstate Cigar Co. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 655 F.2d
29, 32 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming attorney fees for a frivolous motion). Although
Peoples Mortgage Corp. discuses an attorney fee award under state law, it is still an
example of bad faith conduct during litigation and is applicable to the federal courts
as well. 62 F. App’x at 239.
45
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 n.10.
40
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as to whether the bad faith exception applies to the two
prelitigation time periods.46
There are two prelitigation time periods that may give rise to
the bad faith exception. The first is the time period in which the
conduct underpinning the cause of action occurred.47 This
conduct encompasses most intentional acts committed by the bad
faith party, including embezzlement, battery, and fraud.48 When
such conduct is carried out with extreme bad faith, some courts
have found it sufficient to warrant the bad faith exception to the
American rule.49 The second prelitigation time period begins
when the injured party attempts to assert its legal right and ends
upon the commencement of the litigation.50 Some circuits hold
that bad faith conduct by a party during this period—that is,
refusing to recognize its opponent’s clear legal right—warrants
the bad faith exception.51 They consider such conduct sufficient
to allow for fee-shifting because the “action should have been
unnecessary and was compelled by the [party’s] unreasonable,
obdurate obstinacy.”52
46
Peterson, 622 F. Supp. at 238 (“On the other hand, some courts will award
attorney’s fees for bad faith in that conduct which gave rise to the litigation
itself . . . .” (emphasis added)).
47
Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982).
48
This was the case in the scenario described above. See supra text
accompanying notes 5–6; see also Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
49
See id.
50
Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d 541, 550
(9th Cir. 1992); Stolberg v. Bd. of Trs., 474 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1973).
51
See Schlein, 160 F.2d at 45. This Note will refer to this type of conduct as the
“middle” timeline.
52
Stolberg, 474 F.2d at 490 (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th
Cir.1965)); see also infra Part III.C. Of course a party’s conduct can only be
characterized as bad faith if there is no genuine dispute and the party still refuses to
recognize it adversary’s legal right. See Tenants & Owners in Opp’n to Redev. v. U.S.
Dep’t of HUD, 406 F. Supp. 960, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (“Vigorous advocacy involves
conflict and is a natural and expected by-product of litigation in our judicial system.
It is only conduct that clearly goes beyond generally accepted vigor and persistence
commonly employed in our adversary system that may be considered in determining
whether sanctions should be imposed.” (emphasis added)). Said another way:
Applying the bad faith exception when there is a genuine dispute would not
be consonant with the right in a free society to use the legal process nor
with the main purpose of courts—to settle disputes. For example, if there is
a genuine controversy as to the facts or the law, mere refusal to settle
should never be considered obstinancy. There must be more.
Chipser, supra note 1, at 330. Moreover, the actual award is limited to the costs
directly related to the bad faith party’s obstinacy. See Lipsig v. Nat’l Student Mktg.
Corp., 633 F.2d 178, 181 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Obstinacy awards must be limited,
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III. THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION ACCORDING TO THE COURTS
A.

The Leading Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court first ruled on which time period qualifies
for the bad faith exception in 1962. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, the
Court awarded attorney fees in a suit brought by a seaman for
his employer’s failure to respond to a claim for maintenance and
cure.53 First, the Court laid down the principle that an attorney
fee award is “ ‘part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the
federal courts.’ ”54 Using this principle, the Court found that the
employer callously refused to make any investigation into the
seaman’s claim, and “[a]s a result of that recalcitrance, [the
seaman] was forced to hire a lawyer and go to court to get what
was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries old.”55
Finding the employer’s behavior to be “willful and persistent,”
the Court awarded the seaman his attorney fees.56 The Court
classified its fifty percent contingency attorney fee award as
“damages suffered for [the employer’s] failure to pay
maintenance”57 and therefore, a “necessary expense[ ].”58
While Vaughan’s facts fell within the middle timeline—when
a party obstinately denies his opponent’s clear legal right prior to
however, to payment for work and expense attributable to bad-faith endeavors.”)
(citing Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d
Cir. 1977)); see also Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975).
53
369 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1962).
54
Id. at 530 (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939)).
For more information on the courts equitable powers, see: Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,
4–5 (1973); Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164–65 & n.2; Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U.S. 451, 457
(1892); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 535–36 (1881); Alexander B. Rotbart,
Comment, Sanctions and the Inherent Power: The Supreme Court Expands the
American Rule’s Bad Faith Exception for Fee Shifting—Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
16 NOVA L. REV. 1527, 1540–41 (1992). The equity jurisdiction of the federal courts
originated in the English Court of Chancery, which was empowered to allocate “the
entire expenses of the litigation of one of the parties as fair justice to the other party
will permit . . . .” Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164–65 & n.1. See generally 1 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA §§ 57–58 (14th ed. 1918).
55
Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 530–31.
56
Id. at 531.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 530 (quoting Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371
(1932)). Despite Vaughan classifying its attorney fee award as “damages,” eleven
years later the Supreme Court reclassified the award as bad faith attorney fees. See
Hall, 412 U.S. at 2, 4.
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the start of litigation—the Court did not make any distinctions
between the two prelitigation time periods in later cases as they
relate to the bad faith exception.59 Instead, the Court “recognized
that attorneys’ fees may be awarded to a successful party when
his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.”60
A decade later, in Hall v. Cole,61 the Supreme Court set forth
the parameters for the bad faith exception’s timeline. There, the
Court affirmed an attorney fee award for an expelled union
member who regained his union membership in a suit brought
under a federal statute,62 by noting “that ‘bad faith’ may be
found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in
the conduct of the litigation.”63
More recently, the Court reexamined the bad faith exception
in greater detail. In Chambers v. NASCO Inc.,64 Chambers—a
sole shareholder and director of a radio and television station—
contracted to sell his station and license to the NASCO
corporation.65 When Chambers instead sold the station to a third
During the
party, NASCO sued for breach of contract.66
litigation, Chambers attempted to sell his properties to a third
party so that “the District Court would lack jurisdiction over the
properties.”67 Moreover, Chambers “intentionally withheld [this]
information from the court.”68 Despite being warned by the
district court, Chambers “refused to allow NASCO to inspect [its]

59
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129–30 (1974). The two time
periods of prelitigation conduct are: (1) the conduct underlying the claim itself and
(2) the middle timeline, when a party obstinately refuses to recognize its opponent’s
clear legal right. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50; see also Skehan v. Bd. of
Trs. of Bloomsburg State Coll., 538 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[T]here is
a[n] . . . exception to the American rule, which allows the recovery of fees as an
element of damages for prelitigation vexation or oppression in resisting a just
claim.”).
60
F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 129.
61
412 U.S. 1 (1973).
62
Id. at 2, 4.
63
Id. at 15.
64
501 U.S. 32 (1991).
65
Id. at 35–36.
66
Id. at 36.
67
Id. at 36–37.
68
Id. at 37. Chambers did more than neglect to mention the attempted sale; the
court explicitly questioned him about it. See id.
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corporate records.”69 “Chambers [then] proceeded with ‘a series
of meritless motions and pleadings and delaying actions.’ ”70
When the district court entered judgment in favor of
NASCO, Chambers appealed.71 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit “found the appeal frivolous” and therefore, imposed
sanctions “and remanded the case to the district court with
orders to fix the amount of appellate sanctions and to determine
whether further sanctions should be imposed for the manner in
which the litigation had been conducted.”72 The district court
found that additional “sanctions were appropriate ‘for the
manner in which this proceeding was conducted in the district
court.’ ”73 Therefore, the “[district] court imposed sanctions . . . in
the form of attorney’s fees and expenses totaling $996,644.65” for
the way Chambers conducted in both the district and appellate
court proceedings.74
69

Id. at 38.
Id. (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu TV & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138
(W.D. La. 1989)), aff’d, 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, sub nom., Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)).
71
Id. at 39–40.
72
Id. at 40.
73
Id. (quoting Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 123).
74
Id. This amount “represented the entire amount of NASCO’s litigation costs
paid to its attorneys.” Id. The district court examined several approaches to
determine if sanctions were also appropriate for Chambers’s conduct in the district
court. The court “first considered Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. It noted that
the alleged sanctionable conduct was that Chambers and the other defendants
had . . . ‘filed false and frivolous pleadings.’ ” Id. at 41 (quoting Calcasieu TV &
Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 138). The court, however, found that the “falsity of the
pleadings at issue did not become apparent until after the trial on the merits, so that
it would have been impossible to assess sanctions at the time the papers were filed.
Consequently, the District Court deemed Rule 11 ‘insufficient’ for its purposes.” Id.
(quoting Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 139). The district court also “declined
to impose sanctions under § 1927, both because the statute applies only to attorneys,
and therefore would not reach Chambers, and because the statute was [also] not
broad enough to reach ‘acts which degrade the judicial system.’ ” Id. at 41–42
(quoting Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 139); see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006)
(“Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”).
Instead, the court used its “inherent power in imposing sanctions, stressing that ‘the
wielding of that inherent power is particularly appropriate when the offending
parties have practiced a fraud upon the court.’ ” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 42 (quoting
Calcasieu TV & Radio, 124 F.R.D. at 139). The court’s authority to impose feeshifting comes from its inherent power. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
This power is the source for the court’s authority to apply the bad faith exception
70
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The Supreme Court, in validating the attorney fee award,
discussed the little-known equity power that federal courts
possess. “Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of that
discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for
conduct which abuses the judicial process.”75 The Court held that
“outright dismissal of a lawsuit . . . is a particularly severe
sanction, yet is within the court’s discretion. Consequently, the
‘less severe sanction’ of an assessment of attorney’s fees is
undoubtedly within a court’s inherent power as well.”76
Rounding out its equity power discussion, the Court explained
that “ ‘[t]he award of attorney’s fees for bad faith serves the same
purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil contempt,’ because ‘it
vindicates the District Court’s authority over a recalcitrant
litigant.’ ”77
Finally, “[b]ased on the circumstances of this case,” the
Court found “that the District Court acted within its discretion in
assessing as a sanction for Chambers’ bad faith conduct the
entire amount of NASCO’s attorney’s fees.”78 The Court also
noted that it “express[ed] no opinion as to whether the District
Court would have had the inherent power to sanction Chambers
for conduct relating to the underlying breach of contract.”79
B.

Some Early Circuit Court Cases Have Implied That the Bad
Faith Exception Applies to All Prelitigation Conduct

Older cases coming out of two circuits seem to extend the bad
faith exception to all conduct, even the conduct that gave rise to
the substantive claims. In 1947, in Schlein v. Smith,80 the D.C.
Circuit affirmed fee-shifting on account of the losing party’s
criminal and oppressive conduct that preceded the litigation.81
and therefore, to impose attorney fee-shifting on certain losing parties. See Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973).
75
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45 (citation omitted).
76
Id. at 45 (citation omitted) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 765 (1980)).
77
Id. at 53 (Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978)).
78
Id. at 55.
79
Id. at 55 n.16.
80
160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
81
Id. at 25. “[I]t is an almost universally recognized rule that [attorney fees]
may be recovered in cases . . . where the wrongful action complained of is
characterized by some such circumstances of aggravation as willfulness,
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Four years later, in Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,82 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed an attorney fee award for individuals
who were oppressed by their union before the litigation started.83
These cases, however, are not persuasive in determining the
contemporary bad faith exception timeline for several reasons.
First, both cases are over a half-century old84 and neither circuit
has come out with similar holdings recently.85 Second, whether
these cases actually extend the bad faith exception to all
prelitigation conduct is disputed.86 Third, both of these cases
predate the three Supreme Court cases that set forth the
elements of the bad faith exception.87
C.

The Supreme Court Cases Have Been Interpreted Differently
by the Circuits

The Sixth Circuit held that the bad faith exception is
inapplicable to conduct that gives rise to the claim.88 In
Shimman v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
18, a “[d]issident” union member was assaulted at a union
meeting.89
In evaluating the union member’s request for

wantonness, malice, oppression, brutality, insult, recklessness, gross negligence, or
gross fraud on the part of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Ballard v. Spruill, 74 F.2d
464, 466 (1934)).
82
186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
83
Id. at 481. “The Court noted that the defendant union was a powerful
organization as contrasted with the insular impotency of the plaintiff members.”
Chipser, supra note 1, at 327.
84
Rolax, 186 F.2d 473 (decided in 1951); Schlein, 160 F.2d 22 (decided in 1947).
85
It is unclear, however, whether these circuits had the opportunity to apply the
bad faith exception to conduct giving rise to the action.
86
Compare Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d
1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that Schlein does not apply “to an attorney fee
award arising from a federal statutory claim for which punitive damages are
inappropriate”), and id. (finding the common benefit exception as the basis for
Rolax’s attorney fee award), with Schlein, 160 F.2d at 25 (holding that “it was proper
to award counsel fees” for the prelitigation fraud by a mortgagor), and Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 600 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that the fee award in
Rolax was for “activity which formed the basis for the suit”).
87
These cases are Vaughan, Hall, and Chambers. See supra Part III.A. The
earliest of these cases, Vaughan, was not decided until 1962. Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527 (1962).
88
744 F.2d 1226, 1233 (6th Cir. 1984).
89
An earlier appeal discusses the facts in greater detail. See Shimman v. Frank,
625 F.2d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom., Shimman, 744 F.2d 1226.
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attorney fees under the bad faith exception, the Sixth Circuit
found that that
[t]he bad faith considered by courts construing this exception
generally falls within one of three categories: (1) bad faith
occurring during the course of the litigation; (2) bad faith in
bringing an action or in causing an action to be brought; and
(3) bad faith in the acts giving rise to the substantive claim.90

The court then delineated which prelitigation time period is
subject to the bad faith exception: “Care must be taken to
distinguish a defendant’s bad faith in necessitating that an
action be filed or in maintaining a defense from a defendant’s bad
faith in the acts giving rise to the claim.”91
The Shimman Court held that the bad faith exception should
not extend to conduct giving rise to the action and was not
persuaded by the Supreme Court’s dicta in Hall v. Cole.92
Although Hall’s language supports extending the bad faith
exception to the acts giving rise to the claim, the Shimman Court
found such an interpretation unpersuasive for several reasons.93
First, the court pointed out that Hall’s language was merely
dictum, and therefore, not binding.94 Second, the court disputed
this broad interpretation of Hall’s language.95 Hall quoted
Moore’s Federal Practice as evidence that the bad faith exception
applies only to litigation conduct.96 This quoted passage, the
Shimman Court noted, is preceded by the following phrase:
“where an unfounded action or defense is brought or
maintained.”97 The court found this phrase to be evidence that
the exception, as interpreted by Moore’s, only applies to conduct

90

Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1230.
Id.
92
412 U.S. 1 (1973); see Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1232.
93
The Shimman Court actually mentioned four reasons for its holding, but only
two of them have general application. See Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1232–34.
94
See id. at 1232.
95
Id. at 1232–33. “It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ may be found, not only in
the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.” Hall,
412 U.S. at 15.
96
Hall, 412 U.S. at 5 (“[F]ederal court[s] may award counsel fees to a successful
party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.” (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1709 (2d ed. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
97
Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1233 (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1709 (2d ed. 1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
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during the litigation.98 Therefore, the Shimman Court concluded,
it “is clear that Hall did not extend the bad faith exception” to
the acts giving rise to the claim.99
Finally, the Shimman Court held that applying the bad faith
exception to the acts giving rise to the claim defeats the rationale
of the general rule that parties bear their own fees.100 “[T]he
American rule protects the right to go to court and litigate a nonfrivolous claim or defense. The unsuccessful litigant is not
penalized even when an injured party whose claim is upheld is
not made completely whole because of the cost of litigation.”101
Other federal courts have similarly applied the bad faith
exception to conduct falling within the middle timeframe—bad
faith in bringing an action or causing an action to be brought.
Unlike the Shimman Court, however, these courts have not
ignored the language in Hall that discussed the exception’s
timeline.102 For example, in Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v.
Horizon Air Industries,103 a “union filed suit against Horizon
under the Railway Labor Act . . . , alleging [that] Horizon had
violated its duty . . . to ‘exert every reasonable effort’ to reach
agreement with the union.”104 The district court sided with the
union and required Horizon to “cease and desist from engaging in
any conduct that [was] designed to forestall an agreement.”105
The court found the union was entitled to attorney fees in the
amount of $250,713.50.106

98

Id. at 1233 n.10.
Id. The Shimman Court, therefore, held that the bad faith exception only
applies to conduct during litigation and the middle timeline, but not to the conduct
that gave rise to the claim. See id. at 1232. The court actually classified these first
two reasons as one, see id.; however, this Note uses a more delineated classification.
100
See id. at 1231.
101
Id. The court went onto to explain the reasoning and policy behind the bad
faith exception: “The unsuccessful litigant may be penalized, however, if the
litigation was not maintained in good faith. In such a case, the successful party has
ordinarily suffered two wrongs: one in the events giving rise to the litigation, and
another in the wrongful conduct or instigation of the litigation.” Id.
102
A literal reading of “ ‘bad faith’ may be found, not only in the actions that led
to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation” calls for extending the bad
faith exception to prelitigation conduct. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
103
976 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1992).
104
Id. at 543 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)).
105
Id. (quoting Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., No. 89-465,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12621, at *21 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 1990)).
106
Id.
99
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Upon review, the Ninth Circuit overturned the attorney fees
award.107 The court’s holding focused on policy.108 The court
declined to apply the bad faith exception to prelitigation conduct
to avoid “conflict with the rationale of the American rule.”109
Instead, it interpreted Hall’s language as not extending the bad
faith exception to all prelitigation bad faith conduct.110
Ultimately, the court limited Hall’s timeline language to
prelitigation conduct when the losing party obstinately denied
his opponent its clear legal right.111 The court held that Hall did
not intend to subject such conduct to the bad faith exception.112
The Second Circuit, in multiple cases, has also held that a
party’s denial of its opponent’s clear legal right warrants the bad
faith exception.
In Stolberg v. Members of the Board of
Trustees,113 a pre-Hall v. Cole decision, the Second Circuit held
that a college professor who was wrongly denied tenure by
university officials was entitled to fee-shifting because: (1) his
“constitutional rights . . . were clear”; (2) “the long course of
vindication of those rights . . . should . . . have been unnecessary”;
and (3) awarding fees would help foster the “future exercise of
107

See id. at 552.
See id. at 549–51.
109
Id. at 550.
110
Id.
111
Id. The court used a limited bad faith exception despite the numerous
contradictory implications from previous Ninth Circuit holdings. See Dollar Sys.,
Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., Inc., 890 F.2d 165, 176 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding an
attorney award because the losing party acted in “bad faith in its conduct both prior
to and during the course of the litigation”); McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082, 1086
(9th Cir. 1983) (remanding the case to the district court to adjudicate the “factual
dispute as to the bad faith, if any, of the government both before and during the
course of this litigation”); Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th
Cir. 1982) (applying the bad faith exception because the defendant “pursued the
action after it discovered [one of its employees had lied], particularly by bringing
needless, almost frivolous motions” (emphasis added)). The court in Flight
Attendants noted these prior cases and made efforts to reconcile them with its
holding. See 976 F.2d at 549 nn.10–11. Significantly, the Flight Attendants Court did
not address other Ninth Circuit cases that have held prelitigation bad faith conduct
warrants the bad faith exception. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding the “district court appropriately
awarded attorney fees” to prevailing plaintiff where defendants’ “violation of
[plaintiff’s] trademark rights and copyrights and [defendants’] conspiracy to pass off
an imitation product constituted extraordinary, malicious, wanton, and oppressive
conduct” which, in turn, gave rise to litigation in question).
112
See Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 549–50.
113
474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
108
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such rights at public institutions by other public employees.”114
The court emphasized that the professor’s employment contract
was not renewed “for reasons that were found to be
constitutionally improper and which have never been seriously
contested by [the university].”115 The Second Circuit interprets
the bad faith exception to apply to a situation where litigation
was “unnecessary” and only occurred due to the losing party’s
“obstinacy.”116
A year later, in Class v. Norton,117 decided shortly after Hall
v. Cole, the Second Circuit again held that the middle timeline
warrants the bad faith exception.118 Addressing Hall’s impact on
its reasoning, the court stated: “Moreover, insofar as this
standard for awarding costs and attorneys’ fees has been
assimilated to bad faith, the evidence marshaled by the court
sufficiently supports such a finding.”119
114

Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
116
See id. (“[T]he standard is whether ‘bringing of the action should have been
unnecessary and was compelled by the school board’s unreasonable, obdurate
obstinacy . . . .’ Because suit clearly should have been unnecessary in this case and
was compelled by defendants’ conduct, counsel fees should have been awarded.”
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321
(4th Cir. 1965)). The court did not explicitly say that prelitigation bad faith conduct
is insufficient to warrant an attorney fees award. Nevertheless, the court’s entire
thrust is on the losing party’s obstinacy, and it refers to this conduct as “the
standard,” which implies that the conduct must occur during the time period—or the
litigation itself—for fee-shifting to be appropriate. See id. If the court interpreted the
bad faith exception differently, the original bad faith act that was the cause of the
claim—the improper denial of tenure for the professor—should be acknowledged in
the court’s decision to award attorney fees.
117
505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974).
118
Id. at 127.
119
Id. (citations omitted). This statement was immediately preceded by the
court’s declaration of the obstinacy test. Id. (“[T]he award of costs and attorneys’
fees . . . is warranted where bringing of the action should have been unnecessary and
was compelled by . . . unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
More recently, Second Circuit district courts reiterated that the bad faith exception
is applicable to the middle timeline.
It is obvious that bad faith conduct by a party prior to litigation may be
part of a pattern of misconduct which carries forward into the litigation.
However, it is the law that a party’s bad faith, either prior to or during the
litigation, may be the basis for an award of attorneys’ fees under the
common law rule.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 590 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(emphasis added)); see N.Y. State Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund v.
115
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D. Circuits That Only Apply the Bad Faith Exception to
Litigation Conduct
Three circuits have limited the bad faith exception to only
apply to conduct during the litigation.120 The Eighth Circuit,
relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers,
held that the bad faith exception only applies to conduct during
litigation.121
In Lamb Engineering & Construction Co. v.
Nebraska Public Power District,122 Nebraska Public Power
District (“NPPD”) contracted with Lamb to upgrade its sixty-five
mile transmission line.123 A problem arose in that “immediately
after NPPD awarded Lamb the contract, NPPD increased its
original estimate of work to be performed by 80%, but refused to
extend Lamb’s time for performance.”124
NPPD’s refusal
increased Lamb’s costs.125 After inclement weather hindered
Lamb’s progress, NPPD invoked the contract’s termination
clause.126 When NPPD refused to pay Lamb’s termination costs,
Lamb filed suit alleging that NPPD was responsible for its
“reasonable and proper charges for termination.”127 “After a jury
awarded Lamb damages,” the district court granted Lamb an
attorney fee award on account of NPPD’s bad faith.128
Hoh, 561 F. Supp. 687, 688–689 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that defendants were
entitled to attorney fees since “plaintiff had not provided a scintilla of evidence to
support its claimed violation of [the statute] and that its other arguments under that
statute were wholly without merit. . . . It [was] clear . . . that [plaintiff had] brought
this action in bad faith . . . .”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
At least one of these courts relied on Hall’s dictum in determining the timeline for
the exception. See Sierra Club, 590 F. Supp. at 1514.
120
While this section counts the Second Circuit as a circuit that only applies the
bad faith exception to litigation conduct, there are Second Circuit courts that
interpret the exception more broadly. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying
text.
121
Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422, 1436–37
(8th Cir. 1997).
122
103 F.3d 1422.
123
Id. at 1427.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1427–28.
126
Id. at 1428–29.
127
Id. at 1429. Only two of Lamb’s original three causes of action survived
summary judgment, and the parties voluntarily dismissed one of the two surviving
claims before trial. See id.
128
Id. at 1430. The bad faith was either based on the jury’s affirmative response
to an interrogatory given to the jury by the court to “determine whether NPPD acted
in bad faith in administering the contract . . . or alternatively, [based] on the district
court’s own finding of bad faith.” Id.
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The Eighth Circuit reversed the attorney fee award because
it held that the bad faith exception applied to litigation conduct
only.129 This limited interpretation of the exception’s timeline
was based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc.130 In Chambers, the Supreme Court approved the
district court’s grant of attorney fees as “impos[ing] sanctions for
the fraud [the defendant] perpetrated on the court and the bad
faith he displayed toward both his adversary and the court
throughout the course of the litigation.”131 The Eighth Circuit
interpreted Chambers as rejecting the imposition of sanctions for
the defendant’s breach of contract.132
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit’s bad faith exception allows
attorney fee awards only for litigation conduct. In Morganroth &
Morganroth v. DeLorean,133 the plaintiff was granted partial
summary judgment for a diversity suit to set aside a fraudulent
property transfer and was also awarded attorney fees on account
of the defendant’s bad faith.134 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit overturned the district court’s discretionary
decision to grant attorney fees.135 “[T]he district judge expressly
stated that the award of attorney’s fees was not based on the
conduct of the litigation. Instead, the district court made it very
clear that the award was based on the underlying previous
conduct which gave rise to the cause of action . . . .”136 Instead,
129

Id. at 1437.
501 U.S. 32 (1991).
131
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 54.
132
See Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1437. Other Eighth Circuit courts have similarly
applied this version of the bad faith exception. See, e.g., Kelly v. Golden, 352 F.3d
344, 352 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The power to award fees is exercisable only with respect to
conduct occurring during the litigation, not conduct that gave rise to the cause of
action.”); First Nat’l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712, 713 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Red
Sch. House, Inc. v. Office of Econ. Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1194 (D. Minn.
1974); Chipser, supra note 1, at 329.
133
213 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2000).
134
Id. at 1305, 1317. The plaintiff’s claim was under title 28, chapter 6, section 6
of the Utah Code, which “deems a transfer fraudulent without requiring proof of
actual intent to defraud” for certain questionable transfers. Id. at 1305.
135
Id. at 1317–18. “Although generally we review a district court’s award of
attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion, we review its application of the legal
principles underlying the award de novo.” Id. at 1317.
136
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Rogler v. Standard Ins. Co., 30 F. App’x 909,
914 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[F]ederal district court has the inherent power to ‘assess
attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith . . . .’ ”) (quoting Chambers, 501
U.S. at 45); id. (“However, this power only extends to ‘bad faith conduct in
130

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 693 (2010)

2010]

BAD FAITH FEE-SHIFTING

713

the circuit court held that the bad faith exception is limited to
litigation conduct. Such a holding, it believed, reflected a “clear
majority” of federal courts.137 In addition, it emphasized that “[a]
defendant found liable for fraud, for instance, would
automatically be guilty of bad faith with respect to the
underlying cause of action, thus, abrogating the American Rule
in all successful fraud actions. Such complete abrogation is not
the purpose of the bad faith exception.”138 This court surprisingly
makes no mention of Hall v. Cole.139
Lastly, a Second Circuit case, Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v.
Rascator Maritime S.A.,140 expressly limited the bad faith
exception to litigation conduct.141 “The appropriate focus for the
court in applying the bad-faith exception to the American rule is
the conduct of the party in instigating or maintaining the
litigation, for an assessment of whether there has been
substantive bad faith . . . or procedural bad faith . . . .”142
litigation.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1317)); Ryan v.
Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 277 (10th Cir. 1978) (“A situation in which attorney’s fees are
permissible is where the opponent in litigation has acted ‘in bad faith . . . .’ ”
(citations omitted) (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)). The court also
referenced its earlier opinions. “We have held that this is beyond the district court’s
inherent powers in federal litigation.” Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1317 (citations
omitted). Although the court was sitting in diversity, it refrained from ruling
whether the bad faith exception actually ruled: “We have already noted that this
award could not be sustained under Towerridge, if federal law governed.
Because . . . we conclude that Utah law does not authorize the award of fees in this
case either, we need not decide which law applies.” Id.
137
Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1318.
138
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
139
See id.
140
782 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986).
141
Id. at 345. Due to the case’s complicated fact pattern, this author just uses
the case’s rule of law. See id. at 332–33.
142
Id. at 345 (emphasis added); see Crum & Forster Ins. Co. v. Goodmark
Indus., No. 05-CV-3633, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 17,
2008) (denying attorney fees because the moving party did “not allege that the
Defendants committed misconduct or acted in bad faith in relation to the present
civil action before this Court”). In truth, there is an unrecognized split within the
Second Circuit regarding what conduct warrants the bad faith exception. This
author was a victim of the false sense of universality that Dow Chemicals took for
granted. Dow Chem., 782 F.2d at 345. After doing extensive research as part of a
judicial internship, the author wrote a memo advocating fee-shifting for the
insurance company of this Note’s theoretical case due to the business owner’s
exceptional prelitigation bad faith. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. In the
meantime, United States District Court Judge Spatt issued an opinion denying the
attorney fee motion—and making the author’s memo moot—basing his holding on a
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IV. THE BAD FAITH EXCEPTION: HOW BROAD SHOULD IT BE?
A.

Response to the Circuits That Limit the Bad Faith Exception

Circuit courts limiting the bad faith exception’s timeline
have found that applying the exception to prelitigation conduct
overemphasizes the Supreme Court’s dictum and contradicts the
policies behind the American rule and the view of most federal
courts.143
These reasons, however, can be addressed and
neutralized, thereby leaving no excuse for courts to refrain from
extending the bad faith exception to all conduct, including both
prelitigation time periods.
First, the Sixth Circuit in Shimman highlighted that Hall’s
language, which seemingly extended the bad faith exception to
prelitigation conduct, was dictum144 and as such should be
discounted. The Hall Court used a quote from Moore’s Federal
Practice to support its version of the bad faith exception.145 As
evidence that Moore’s only intended the exception to be applied to
litigation conduct, the Shimman Court highlighted the passage
in Moore’s immediately preceding what Hall quoted—“where an
unfounded action or defense is brought or maintained.”146
The Shimman reasoning discounts the fact that Supreme
Court dictum is still important.147 Moreover, Hall quoted Moore’s
for a list of the types of conduct that qualify for the exception and
purposely omitted the text that set forth the time periods that

different line of Second Circuit cases. See Crum, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54757, at
*8–10. As both lines of cases ignored the fact that there was a dispute, disturbingly,
both the Crum opinion and this author’s memo could present their individual
version of the Second Circuit’s holding as universal.
143
Some of these circuits have limited the exception to litigation, while others
also apply the bad faith exception to the middle timeline—when a party refuses to
recognize its opponent legal right. See supra Part III.C–D. All circuits whose
reasoning is discussed in that Part have refused to apply the bad faith exception to
the act that gave rise to the claim. See supra Part III.C–D.
144
See Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226,
1232 (6th Cir. 1984).
145
See id. at 1233.
146
Id. (“Moore’s Federal Practice precedes the quoted words with the statement,
‘where an unfounded action or defense is brought or maintained. . . .’ It thus is clear
that Hall did not extend the bad faith exception.” (quoting 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1709 (2d ed. 1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
147
This is especially true when the court goes out of its way to set forth the
elements of a common-law rule. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973).
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qualify for the exception.148 At the very least, the actual Supreme
Court opinion149 should carry more weight than the words of a
treatise that it omitted.
Second, the Shimman Court held that applying the bad faith
exception to prelitigation conduct defeats the American rule’s
rationale that parties bear their own fees.150 Similarly, in
Morganroth, the Tenth Circuit held that a “defendant found
liable for fraud, for instance, would automatically be guilty of bad
faith with respect to the underlying cause of action,” and “[s]uch
complete abrogation is not the purpose of the bad faith
exception.”151 The general purpose behind the American rule—as
the Supreme Court highlighted—is to encourage parties to
“vindicate their rights.”152 This, however, does not apply to a
party that acts in extreme bad faith because such actions go
beyond “merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.”153 Since the
rule’s rationale is inapplicable to a party that acts in bad faith—
even if such actions occur before the litigation—so too should the
American rule itself be inapplicable in such situations.
Accordingly, all bad faith conduct should warrant the bad faith
exception.
Moreover, there are important safeguards rooted in the bad
faith exception to assure the exception does not completely
abrogate the American rule. First, the conduct’s character must
amount to extreme bad faith.154 Second, the award must serve
the purposes of justice.155 Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit’s
148

See id. at 5.
Id. at 15 (“It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ may be found, not only in the
actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.”).
150
See Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1231.
151
Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
152
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
(“Since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit . . . .”).
153
Id.; see also Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1318 (finding the American rule does
not apply in fraud cases).
154
See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987); Beaudry Motor Co.
v. ABKO Props., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1986); Cubita et al., supra note 1,
at 284 (“Indeed, fee shifting under the ‘bad faith’ doctrine is justified only in
exceptional circumstances.”).
155
See Lipsig v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“[T]he fee- shifting sanction is invocable only for some dominating reason of
justice.”); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979).
149

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 693 (2010)

716

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:693

reasoning is circular: If fee-shifting in all fraud cases is in line
with the policies behind both the American rule and its bad faith
exception, why is “[s]uch complete abrogation . . . not the purpose
of the bad faith exception?”156
Third, in Flight Attendants, the Ninth Circuit, uncomfortable
with disregarding the Hall dictum, applied the exception to the
middle timeline but not to the conduct that gave rise to the
substantive claim.157 Although this holding technically “fits in”
with the Hall dictum, it overlooks the fact that Hall did not make
any distinctions within the prelitigation time periods.158
Moreover, since the policies behind the American rule do not give
sufficient cause to apply the rule to any prelitigation bad faith
conduct,159 it is incumbent upon the courts to apply the rule’s
exception to all prelitigation conduct.
Fourth, in Lamb, the Eighth Circuit limited the bad faith
exception because the Supreme Court in Chambers awarded
attorney fees only on the basis of defendant’s bad faith conduct
during the litigation and not for his intentional breach of
contract.160 This reasoning incorrectly focuses only on the district
court’s reasoning for its award. The Supreme Court, however,
was only affirming the award, not granting it.161 The Court was
merely abiding by the district court’s holding and reasoning and
actually noted that the award would also be proper under Rule
11’s sanction power.162
Moreover, as support for its limited bad faith exception
timeline, the Lamb Court reasoned that a wrong on the court—
litigation bad faith—is significantly worse than a wrong on an

156

Morganroth, 213 F.3d at 1318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. Horizon Air Indus., 976 F.2d 541, 550 (9th
Cir. 1992).
158
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Neither did Chambers, Vaughan, or
any other leading Supreme Court opinions that ruled on the bad faith exception. See
generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 (1962).
159
See infra Part IV.B–C.
160
See Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422, 1437
(8th Cir. 1997).
161
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 35.
162
See id. at 50. Rule 11 provides that by presenting a pleading to the court, an
attorney represents—amongst other things—that the litigation “is not being
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
157
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individual—prelitigation bad faith.163 That one conduct is worse,
however, does not prevent both types of conduct from being
sufficient to warrant the bad faith exception.
Chambers,
therefore, does not translate into excluding prelitigation conduct
from the bad faith exception. In fact, the Court went out of its
way to explain that its holding in no way ruled on whether the
bad faith exception applies to prelitigation conduct.164
Fifth, the Tenth Circuit, in Morganroth, limited the bad faith
exception to litigation conduct because it considered such the
holding of the majority of federal courts. This assertion is
tenuous at best165 and contradicts language of the Supreme Court
at worst.166 Moreover, merely counting the number of courts on
each side of the split, without examining the underlying
rationales and policies, is unwarranted.
Although courts have proposed different reasons for limiting
the bad faith exception, none of these reasons—with the possible
exception of policy—withstand scrutiny. Therefore, if it can be
shown that expanding the bad faith exception to all prelitigation
conduct is in line with the policies behind both the American rule
and its bad faith exception, the remaining reasons offered by the
courts for limiting the bad faith exception will be quashed.
B.

Circumventing the Policies Behind the American Rule

The underlying policy behind the American rule is the desire
not to deter parties from going to court. The rule does not want
to deter parties that have a potential legal right.167 Nevertheless,
163

See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.
Id. at 55 n.16 (“We . . . express no opinion as to whether the District Court
would have had the inherent power to sanction Chambers for conduct relating to the
underlying breach of contract . . . .”). Incredibly, the Lamb Court interpreted
Chambers as limiting the bad faith exception to litigation conduct when the
Chambers Court explicitly avoided ruling on that issue. See Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1437.
165
See supra Part III.B–D. Depending on how the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit cases are interpreted, there are between three and five circuits that extend
the exception to prelitigation conduct, while there are three circuits that limit the
exception to litigation. See supra Part III.B–D. Even if the Morganroth court did not
include these other circuits in its analysis, there is still no clear majority that
instructs the court to limit the exception.
166
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (“It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’
may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct
of the litigation.”).
167
Such parties should not be required to pay both parties’ attorney fees should
their claim not be successful, because the threat of such sanctions may prevent them
164
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deterring a bad faith party from bringing or defending court
actions is not a goal of this policy.
Public policy, therefore, dictates that the exception should
apply whether the bad faith was: (1) in the conduct underlying
the claim; (2) in the obstinacy of a party refusing to recognize its
opponent’s clear legal right; or (3) in the litigation itself.168
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since
litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized for
merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor
might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees
of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the time, expense, and
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial
burdens for judicial administration.169

These policies—not deterring parties from “vindicat[ing] their
rights”170 and not burdening the judiciary to determine what
“constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees”171—should be used to
determine whether the American rule or its bad faith exception
applies.
The bad faith exception, therefore, should encompass all
timelines172 because a bad faith party is not an intended
beneficiary of the rule’s protection.173 The bad faith party is not
“merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit”;174 rather the party is
attempting to evade its obligation to compensate its opponent for
its bad faith conduct. Applying the exception as such will not
discourage the “poor” from vindicating their rights. Instead,
they—and all parties—will only be discouraged from pursuing

“from instituting actions to vindicate their rights.” Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
168
For a clearer delineation of the possible timelines, see supra Part II.C.
169
Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
This includes bad faith in the conducting underlying the claim.
173
But see Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226,
1232 (6th Cir. 1984) (“The rationale behind the American rule remains intact when
there is bad faith in the event underlying the substantive claim. A person who
harms another in bad faith is nonetheless entitled to defend a lawsuit in good
faith.”).
174
Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 717.
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litigation when they are undisputedly in the wrong and are
nevertheless pursuing the claim for bad faith purposes.175
Similarly,
the
concern
of
overburdening
judicial
administration does not favor limiting the bad faith exception to
litigation conduct. This is especially true in circuits that have
developed an efficient test to guide their courts in determining
the reasonableness of attorney fee awards. For example, the
Second Circuit has articulated a six-factor test for its courts to
use when they order fee-shifting.176 To ensure reasonableness,
the Second Circuit has also required that the award be “crosscheck[ed]” with the two available tests that evaluate the
reasonableness of an attorney fee award.177 Such a structured
setting requires minimal judicial administration to ensure the
reasonableness of an attorney award.
Moreover, a universal, all-encompassing bad faith exception
will serve as deterrence against frivolous claims. Although
empirical data is unavailable, logically, fewer claims will be filed
and more claims will be settled if parties are on notice that their
bad faith conduct will be punished.178 Therefore, while extending
the bad faith exception to prelitigation conduct will likely
increase motions for attorney fees and the judicial resources
175
An example of a bad faith purpose would be when the party intends to harass
its opponent. Every true dispute, however, will not be subject to the bad faith
exception or its fee-shifting penalty.
176
In Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000), the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set forth six factors for its courts to consider
when determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. These factors are:
“ ‘(1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) the magnitude and complexities of
the litigation; (3) the risk of the litigation . . . ; (4) the quality of representation;
(5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy
considerations.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec.
Regulation, 724 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
177
See id. In the Second Circuit, attorney fee awards are calculated by using
either the “lodestar”—based on hours expended—or the “percentage of the fund”—
contingency—method when determining the amount of the award. Id. Essentially,
all courts utilize both methods, as whichever method a court does not use is still
used to cross-check the award’s reasonableness. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 123 (2d Cir. 2005) (“As a ‘cross-check’ to a percentage
award, courts in this Circuit use the lodestar method.”) (quoting Goldberger, 209
F.3d at 50); Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 50 (“[T]he lodestar remains useful as a baseline
even if the percentage method is eventually chosen.”).
178
See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1612 (1993) (“In England,
approximately ninety-nine percent of all claims for damages are settled before
trial.”).
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needed to determine the reasonableness of such fees, the courts’
ability to avoid entire cases179 will outweigh this additional use of
resources. The judicial resources needed to rule on an attorneyfee motion involving a case with which the judge is familiar with
are substantially less than the judicial resources needed to
adjudicate a new case.180
C.

Promoting the Policies Behind the Bad Faith Exception

Interpreting the bad faith exception to apply to all three time
periods also promotes the policies behind the exception.
“Generally, the policies upheld through the award of costs and
attorney’s fees include: punishment of the losing party,
indemnification of the prevailing party, and the deterrence of
frivolous and bad faith litigation.”181 A party acting in bad faith
before the litigation should not be allowed to escape a fee-shifting
punishment merely because his bad faith conduct occurred before
the litigation; his conduct is just as culpable. Similarly, the party
injured by the bad faith conduct deserves to be indemnified
regardless of the timing of the bad faith. The injured party
should not be responsible for legal costs that were only necessary
due to his opponent’s bad faith, regardless of when the bad faith
occurred.182
Thus, any type of bad faith conduct, even
prelitigation conduct, should be discouraged. It can be said,
therefore, that applying the bad faith exception to all
prelitigation bad faith conduct is directly in line with public
policy. As stated by the Second Circuit: “Assessment of counsel
fees under [bad faith] circumstances in no way conflicts with the
primary justification for the rule against the shifting of counsel
179
This will occur because bad faith parties will properly be deterred from
bringing bad faith litigation.
180
As a new case would involve new law, arguments, facts, procedures, and
possibly jury selection, it is more efficient for a judge who is familiar with the case to
rule on the motion. This author assumes that the Fleischmann Court’s efficient
judicial administration policy was only in the context of adding more motions
without a simultaneous decrease in claim filings. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Otherwise, the argument presented
here seems to refute the Court’s policy. Such an assumption, however, is
counterintuitive, as there will likely be an inverse relationship between the breadth
of the bad faith exception and the number of claims filed.
181
Lord, supra note 7, at 86. For additional sources that explain the policies of
the bad faith exception, see articles cited supra note 29.
182
See Gotanda, supra note 29; Greene, supra note 29; Cubita, supra note 1.
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fees, namely, that the defendant should not be discouraged from
fairly contesting the plaintiff’s claims.”183
The Supreme Court intended for the bad faith exception to
act as a punitive measure.184 A uniform standard for the timeline
of the exception will best effectuate the Court’s objective.185
Conversely, any inconsistency within the federal courts will
weaken a law’s intended deterrence, as a party will not be fully
cognizant of the law and its effects or might think that it can
evade the law’s penalties.186 This is especially true for intracircuit splits, which create more upheaval regarding the state of
the law.187
D. The Bottom Line
The circuit courts’ rulings reflect the confusion regarding the
bad faith exception to the American rule for attorney fees.188
Although such confusion is a natural progression of the
discretionary nature of the exception, a district court’s discretion
should be limited to examining the specific facts of a case and
determining whether the exception applies to such conduct.189
The court, however, should not have discretion to choose which
time period it examines when making its determination.190

183
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973). This
Second Circuit case was decided immediately before the Supreme Court’s Hall v.
Cole decision. See id. at 1281 (decided May 9, 1973); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 1 (1973)
(decided May 21, 1973).
184
See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53 (1991); Hall, 412 U.S. at 5.
185
See Chipser, supra note 1, at 331.
The exception is used only as a remedy for abuse and unnecessary . . . delay
caused by bad faith and obstinacy. Instances of abuse of the exception will
be rare, and its misapplication can be reduced to a minimum if judges and
litigants make sure the developed standards are carefully applied.
Id. (emphasis added).
186
A party might assume that its case will be decided in accordance with those
courts that interpret the bad faith exception in a narrow sense.
187
See, e.g., supra notes 113–20, 140–42 and accompanying text (discussing the
Second Circuit’s split regarding the bad faith exception’s timeline).
188
There is a fractionalized debate as to when the bad faith conduct must occur
to warrant the exception.
189
In other words, the court must use its discretion to determine whether the
facts of the case before it are sufficient to warrant the bad faith exception and its feeshifting consequence.
190
See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 n.13 (1973) (“Although this consideration is
undoubtedly an important one, it is relevant, not to the power of federal courts to
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PROPOSAL

Uniform Timeline

All federal courts should broaden the bad faith exception to
include all time periods—beginning with the conduct that is
underlying the claim and ending with the conclusion of the
litigation. This is consistent with the simple reading in Hall v.
Cole, where the Court—without any request to rule on the
matter—stated: “It is clear, however, that ‘bad faith’ may be
found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in
the conduct of the litigation.”191 Even the courts that interpret
Hall narrowly192 still agree that Hall recommends the bad faith
exception be applied to the middle timeline.193
If Hall is read narrowly and only extends the bad faith
exception to the middle timeline,194 the exception’s policies would
be promoted nearly as efficiently as if this Note’s proposal—that
all prelitigation conduct should be subject to the exception—were
followed. Typically, when conduct underlying the claim is made
in bad faith, the injured party is before the court because its
opponent is obstinately refusing to recognize its clear legal right.
For example, in this Note’s theoretical case involving the
intentional arson and subsequent fraudulent insurance claim,195
it is clear to the business owner, once he is convicted of insurance
fraud, that the insurance company has a legal right to its
payout.196 Therefore, even under the narrower interpretation of
award counsel fees generally, but, rather, to the exercise of the District Court’s
discretion on a case-by-case basis.” (emphasis added)).
191
Id. at 15.
192
See supra Part III.C.
193
See supra Part III.C. This is when the losing party’s refusal to recognize the
prevailing party’s clear legal right forced the prevailing party to go to court to
enforce its right. Although this interpretation of Hall can be squared with the
Court’s language, it overlooks the policies behind the American rule and the bad
faith exception. See supra Part IV.B–C.
194
See supra Part III.C. “Only” distinguishes between the two distinct
prelitigation categories, but the exception certainly also applies to litigation bad
faith conduct.
195
See supra text accompanying note 6.
196
In other words, a party guilty of prelitigation bad faith conduct generally also
forces its adversary to go to court to enforce its clear legal right. An important
exception to this general rule occurs when the conduct underlying the claim was in
bad faith, yet a true legal dispute remains—whether the bad faith party owes its
opponent damages on account of its bad faith conduct. For example, consider a
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Hall,197 prelitigation bad faith conduct typically leads to the same
result: fee-shifting for the injured party.
This Note does not advocate that a court’s decision to apply
the exception should no longer be discretionary; rather it touts
the benefits to the legal system should the scope of the court’s
discretion include all bad faith conduct. Not all prelitigation bad
faith conduct or, for that matter, litigation bad faith conduct198
will necessarily be subject to the bad faith exception. For
example, if a jury finds that the defendant intentionally
defrauded the plaintiff, the bad faith exception automatically
warranted?199
What if the defendant still maintains his
innocence and the plaintiff’s star witness lied because of a
vendetta? Such situations are addressed by the judge, the
arbiter of the exception’s applicability, and not the jury. Not only
does the judge decide whether to apply the exception, but the
exception’s very nature is discretionary.200 The exception is only
to be applied when the conduct is of extreme bad faith and the
fee-shifting serves the interests of justice.201 Therefore, should
partner in a law firm who cheated his partners out of $2 million during the “winding
up”—the period after the dissolution but before all the accounts are settled—of the
partnership. The bad faith partner then declared bankruptcy. The remaining legal
question is whether the bad faith partner had a fiduciary duty to his fellow partners
during the winding up of the partnership. The claims against the partner cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy if he had a fiduciary duty at the point he committed the
fraud. This is similar to the facts of Shiboleth v. Yerushalmi (In re Yerushalmi), 393
B.R. 288, 292, 295 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Assuming the claims against the partner are found to be nondischargeable, the
judge must make a fine distinction in applying the bad faith exception. If the judge
determines that bad faith conduct underlying the action warrants the bad faith
exception, he can award attorney fees for the injured partners. If, however, the judge
determines that the exception is only warranted for the middle timeline, attorney
fees should not be awarded here as the bad faith partner did not deny his opponents
their clear legal right; the legal rights of his partners were unclear and litigation
was necessary to clarify them.
197
See supra text accompanying notes 107–11.
198
As this Note proposes that all prelitigation conduct be subject to the bad faith
exception, the analysis focuses on all three time periods.
199
See Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir.
2000) (“[A] defendant found liable for fraud, for instance, would automatically be
guilty of bad faith with respect to the underlying cause of action, thus abrogating the
American rule in all successful fraud actions.”); supra text accompanying notes 138,
150–56.
200
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 n.13 (1973).
201
See Beaudry Motor Co. v. ABKO Props., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.
1986). An example of when an attorney award for extreme bad faith conduct would
not serve the interests of justice is when the prevailing party has also been guilty of
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the judge determine that the defendant’s guilt is questionable,
the judge can refuse to apply the bad faith exception.
B.

Procedural Effects of the Proposal

The proposal has important procedural implication. Despite
jury charges to the contrary, juries often factor an attorney fee
into the award amount.202 Therefore, juries should be informed
before they reach a verdict of the possibility that the prevailing
party’s attorney fees may be paid by the party’s opponent.203
C.

Predictability as Deterrence

If this proposal were to be adopted by all the circuits,
litigants would be more certain as to the exception’s timeline,
which would induce: (1) less litigation regarding the applicability
of the bad faith exception; (2) less obstinacy by bad faith parties;
and (3) perhaps even less bad faith conduct due to the possible
punitive punishment. Certainty, consistency, and clarity are
important priorities of the judicial system. Moreover, once a
party is clearly put on notice as to which bad faith conduct will be
punished with fee-shifting, the exception will serve as a more
efficient disincentive. Such notice will deter illegitimate behavior
inside and outside of the courtroom, an important purpose of the

misconduct. See, e.g., In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543–44 (E.D. Va. 1972); Lee Nat’l
Corp. v. Kan. City S. Indus., 50 F.R.D. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
202
See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 14 & n.31 (“[I]t is quite likely that juries
[take] legal expenses into consideration when they asses[ ] damages . . . .”).
203
This is still troubling as the jury will not know the judge’s ruling on the
motion for attorney fees when it decides its verdict. Therefore, it is a financial risk
for a party to make a motion for attorney fees: Even if an attorney calculates that
there is a 50% chance the judge will grant the motion—and therefore the award—if
the attorney also calculates a 60% chance that the jury will minimize its award due
to his motion, the motion has a negative expectation value (50% X < 60% X). This is
even worse than a pure chance game. The jury will assume that the attorney will
receive the typical one-third contingency fee and will increase its award accordingly;
a reasonable attorney fee award, however, is often less than that. See, e.g.,
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding 25% to be
a typical attorney fee award). Therefore, even if the judge orders fee-shifting,
requesting such fees may be a net loss for the moving party. This scenario is more a
fundamental problem with juries improperly factoring the attorney fees into their
awards than it is a defect in the bad faith exception.
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exception.204 Finally, this clear notice will also help prevent
“harm done to the court itself,”205 an underlying tenet of the bad
faith exception.
CONCLUSION
The current bad faith exception is applied chaotically by
federal courts. While all courts agree that bad faith conduct
during the litigation is subject to the exception, they are divided
over whether the prelitigation time periods are also within the
exception’s scope. Some circuits have ignored the Supreme
Court’s language altogether. Others have overlooked the policies
behind both the American rule and its bad faith exception.206 To
remedy the chaos, the exception should be applied to all bad faith
conduct—including both prelitigation time periods. Applying the
exception in this manner does not contradict the policies of the
American rule because the party acting in bad faith is not being
punished for bringing an action; it is being punished for bringing
the action in bad faith. Moreover, applying the exception to all
bad faith conduct will deter such conduct, serve the interests of
justice by indemnifying the prevailing party, and punish the bad
faith actor.

204

See Leubsdorf, supra note 1, at 29 (“The ‘bad faith’ doctrine . . . awards
attorney fees against parties who litigate in bad faith, for the obvious purpose of
deterring illegitimate behavior in the courtroom, and sometimes outside it.”).
205
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 n.17 (1991) (explaining that the
shareholder’s “fraudulent transfer of assets [that] took place before the suit was
filed,” but after he was “given notice . . . of the pending suit” perpetrated a “harm
done to the court itself”). Such harm likely refers to the wasted judicial resources
required to adjudicate bad faith actions. See id.; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. HartfordEmpire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) (“[T]ampering with the administration of
justice . . . is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
public . . . .”); supra text accompanying notes 177–80.
206
Adding to the chaos, the Second Circuit has an internal split regarding the
exception’s timeline. See supra note 142.

